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limited amount of insurance. 
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January 2011 1 Introduction
Public intervention in the student loan market is usually motivated by the general view that
the market fails to provide such loans. In other words, student credit is rationed. As a result,
in many countries, governments provide banks with subsidies and/or guarantees against the
risk of default. Then, banks provide student loans. However, loans oered by banks are
always "pure" loans: they do not insure borrowers against the risk of a bad outcome, like
dropping out of university, or being unsuccessful in the labor market. This lack of insurance
in private loans is in deep contrast with the trend observed in many countries where the
repayment of public loans is income contingent. 1 If there is demand for income contingent
loans and banks do not provide them, there is a second failure of the student loan market, to
wit lack of insurance. In this paper, we propose a model that provides a rationale for these
two market failures.
Let us rst review the literature on the specicities of the student loan market, and
explain how the two failures mentioned above result. Limited access to credit, or credit
rationing, has often been attributed to the existence of asymmetric information about the
type of investor, following the strand of the literature initiated by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
In this setting, borrowers have limited liability and face the same expected return, but their
risk diers in the sense of a Mean Preserving Spread (MPS). Under these circumstances, the
riskier investor is willing to pay a higher interest for the loan than the less risky investor. In
the case of unsatised demand, the standard market mechanism would rely on an increase of
the price to clear the market. In this framework, however, an increase in the price of credit -
the interest rate - fails to reach this objective. Indeed, since low risk entrepreneurs drop out
before high risk entrepreneurs, the composition of risks changes, and the expected probability
of success of an investment decreases. It may then be optimal for prot maximizing banks
not to raise the interest rate and to ration credit. This line of argument can explain rationing
of student loans when investments in human capital only dier in the spread of returns, not
the average expected returns, as it is the case in Barr (2001) and Jacobs and van Wijnbergen
(2007).
Nonetheless, in the literature on the economics of education, it is not unusual to nd
the assumption that high ability students face a larger expected return from investing in
1This is the case in countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Canada, the UK, Thailand, Canada
or Spain. See Chapman (2005) and Chapman and Greenaway (2006) for an inter- national overview of ICLs.
The idea of making repayment contingent on income is generally attributed to Friedman and Kuznets (1945).
2education, and that their probability of success is larger. These postulates are at odds
with the Mean Preserving Spread of returns assumption. Instead, they are more in line
with the concept of First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD) used in de Meza and Webb
(1987), where entrepreneurs dier in terms of probability of success, which results in dierent
expected returns to investment. Entrepreneurs facing higher expected returns are more
willing to pay for a loan. If the interest rate rises, entrepreneurs with lower expected returns
drop out rst. It may occur, however, that separation of types is not possible. Then, banks
maximize prots by pooling both types together, and access to credit is unrationed. But this
is not the whole story when it comes to investments in education.
Indeed, human capital investments are also characterized by the important peculiarity
that credit markets "have no security on the asset" (Glennerster (2009)). In other words,
human capital is inalienable, and cannot be used as collateral against loan default. Although
human capital investments materialize in higher earnings, which are seizable, the power for
creditors to garnish wages is in fact generally limited by law.2 If the penalty for default is not
large, debtors may strategically choose to default. This is known as ex-post moral hazard. As
it will be made clearer, accounting for these two main features of human capital investments,
FOSD in the returns to the investment and strategic default in absence of collateral, proves
useful to analyze in a unied framework both credit rationing and lack of insurance in the
student loan market.3
We hence consider a model where students dier in ability on the basis of FOSD. This
ability, which is captured by the student's probability of graduation, is private information.
Individuals are risk averse and need to borrow in order to invest in education. On the student
loan market, banks compete  a la Bertrand and oer menus of loan contracts that may include
insurance against the eventuality of failure.
We obtain the following results. The interaction of ex-post moral hazard and adverse
selection proves fundamental in explaining credit rationing in the context of FOSD. More
precisely, the absence of credit to students results when default penalties are relatively soft.
When default penalties increase, the level of student risk aversion of students is crucial in
determining the market outcome. First, if risk aversion is suciently low and default penal-
ties are intermediate, banks oer pooling contracts at equilibrium. This pooling equilibrium
is characterized by two market failures, namely an absence of contractual insurance from
2Creditor protection legislation shows some heterogeneity and this aects credit market development at
the international level (see La Porta et al. (1998)).
3The argument clearly applies to any investment other than human capital that shares these two features.
3banks and overinvestment in education, since agents with low ability obtain loans. Still with
low risk aversion, increasing default penalties further allows banks to oer a contract that
only high ability agents would accept. Although this contract might contain some contrac-
tual insurance from banks, the global insurance, which combines both legal and contractual
insurance, is lower than that of the pooling equilibrium. Second, if student risk aversion is
high enough, there cannot be pooling (and therefore overinvestment) at equilibrium. Instead,
only a separating equilibrium can replace credit rationing when default penalties increase.
Interestingly, this equilibrium entails more insurance than the rst case's pooling equilibrium,
and would actually be preferred by high types even though they are more risk averse in this
case. In other words, proper selection and higher levels of insurance -although still far from
full insurance- can be obtained if students are suciently risk averse.
The model should not be viewed as an attempt to explain one single piece of evidence.
It rather provides a general framework for the analysis of student loan markets in many
particular instances. Default penalties dier across countries, as so do student levels of
risk aversion, and market failure can result in each case from a dierent combination of
parameters.4 Other parameters, such as expected earnings or the probability of success, not
to mention public policy, may dier not only across countries but even across elds of study
and also aect the market outcome. In particular, we have used the model to show, as a
way of example, that private loans are the more likely to be oered the higher the return to
education in case of success (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2008)) and that the introduction
of subsidies improves the case for private lending (Shen and Ziderman (2007)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model. In
Section 3, we characterize the equilibrium outcomes corresponding to dierent levels of the
default penalty that we label soft, intermediate, larger and largest. Section 4 provides some
additional, comparative static results and Section 5 concludes. More technical details are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
There is a population of unskilled agents of measure 1. At the beginning of the period, agents
decide whether to invest in higher education or not. This investment is risky and has two
possible outcomes  = ff;sg, where f stands for failure and s for success. In case of success,
4Student risk aversion is aected by ...
4an agent becomes skilled and obtains an exogenous wage ws. In case of failure, she remains
unskilled and receives the same wage as an agent who chose not to study, wf. For simplicity,
we assume that the outcome of the investment is common knowledge. Agents dier in ability
a 2 fl;hg, which aects their probability of success: pa with 0 < pl < ph < 1. Although this
probability is private information, the share of agents of high (h) ability in the population,
, is common knowledge.
Investments in higher education are costly. We denote these costs, which comprise tuition
fees and living expenditures, by F. Agents need to borrow in order to nance F. If they do
not accept any loan contract, they remain unskilled and earn with certainty a wage wf.
The credit market consists of a set of prot maximizing banks oering loans of size F,
competing  a la Bertrand. A student loan contract is a pair of interest rates (rs;rf) 2 R2,
where rs and rf are the interest rates charged respectively in case of success and failure. The
contingency of the interest rate to the state of nature allows the loan contract to provide
agents with some insurance, by setting rs > rf. Note that this is precisely what publicly
managed income contingent loan programs do. In particular, it is often the case in these
programs that rs > 0 and rf =  1. In order to simplify notations, we will make use of
R  1 + r, so that the total amount of money a borrower has to pay to the bank in state
of the world  is RF.
Banks may oer more than one contract, or no contract at all. The banks' strategy is
thus to oer a set, or menu of contracts. When facing the menu of contracts, unskilled agents
decide whether to accept one of them or refuse all of them. However, accepting one contract
does not necessarily imply that it will be respected. Indeed, a particularity of our model
is that banks are subject to ex-post moral hazard from borrowers: once the outcome of the
investment in education is realized, agents decide whether to repay the loan or to default
by weighting the gain in resources from non repayment against the punishment for default.
In this paper, as Chen (2005) and Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2008), we model this level
of responsibility as a penalty amount incurred by the defaulting borrower. In particular,
this penalty is dened as the garnishment by the bank of a share g 2 [0;1] of the wage,
w. This is a simplifying assumption that reects the fact that the law prevents banks from
completely expropriating those who default. In other words, the law provides borrowers with
some legal insurance in the form of a safety net (1   g)w. However, as Lochner and Monge-
Naranjo (2008) points out, "Even if human capital cannot be directly repossessed by lenders,
creditors can punish defaulting borrowers in a number of ways (e.g. lowering credit scores,
5seizing assets, garnisheeing a fraction of labor earnings), which tend to have a greater impact
on debtors with higher post-school earnings." This justies the assumption that the penalty
is proportional to earnings.5
All in all, the legal system provides the borrower with some insurance against failure,
even if banks do not oer any contractual insurance. Later, we will refer to a non-insuring
contract when the bank does not provide any contractual insurance in addition to the legal
one.
Agents are risk averse and, prior to making their decision to invest in higher education,
care about the set of consumption levels over their productive life in each state of the world
C  (cf;cs) 2 R2
+, where cs and cf are consumption levels contingent respectively on success
and failure. The utility function is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave and
is denoted U() : R2
+ ! R+. The expected utility of an individual who invests in education
and has probability of success pa is denoted
EUa(C) = paU(cs) + (1   pa)U(cf);
These consumption levels depend both on the accepted loan contract, and on the penalty
the borrower endures in case of default. Indierence curves of the two types of agents







U0(cs), where U is constant. Since  
1 pa
pa is increasing in pa,
dcs
dcfjEUh(C)=U > dcs
dcfjEUl(C)=U0 for all U;U0 2 R+.
Banks get their revenue from loan repayments and/or garnishment of wages, and suer
the costs of borrowing the funds on the international market at the risk-free interest rate i.
The timing of the game is the following:
1. Nature draws the type of an unskilled agent. She will be of high ability (h) with prob-
ability , otherwise her ability is low (l).
2. Banks oer a menu of student loan contracts to potential students.
3. Each potential student observes the menu of contracts and decides, given her ability,
whether to accept one of the loan contracts or refuse all of them and remain unskilled.
5Moreover, in many countries, defaulters can indeed be subject to the garnishment of up to a certain
proportion of the wage. In the case of the Federal Family Educational Loan, in the USA, the garnishment
rate is set at a maximum of 15%. In Portugal, this proportion reaches 30%.
In other countries, such as Spain, the scheme of default penalties follows a non-linear pattern.
6If banks oer no contract, the agent remains unskilled.
4. If the agent accepts one contract, the investment in higher education materializes and,
accounting for the agent's ability, nature realizes the outcome ( 2 ff;sg) of the
investment.
5. The borrower pays the loan or defaults, in which case banks recover the loan up to the
legal limit gw.
2.1 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies.6
As described in the timing of the game, a strategy prole gathers three strategies: banks'
oer of the menu of contracts, agents' acceptance of one of the contracts or refusal of all of
them, and, nally, once the outcome is realized and in case agents have subscribed to one
contract, agents' compliance with the contract or default. To be an SPNE, a strategy prole
must be such that
1. At stage 5, borrowers maximize utility by defaulting if RF > gw.
2. At stage 3, an unskilled agent accepts the contract that provides her with the high-
est level of utility, provided the latter is higher than the one obtained by remaining
unskilled. Otherwise, she refuses all contracts.
3. At stage 2, banks oer a menu of student loan contracts that maximize expected prots.
Because of Bertrand competition, the highest value for expected prots is zero, so that
at equilibrium, every contract (Rf;Rs) in the menu must be such that
E(q;Rf;Rs) = q min(RsF;gws) + (1   q)min(RfF;gwf)   IF
= 0;
where q 2 [0;1] is the expected probability of success of the agents for whom the
contract is intended.
6Even though there are two types and information is asymmetric, the equilibrium concept does not need
to rely on Bayesian expectations. Indeed, the uninformed players - banks - do not need to formulate beliefs
about which type will take a contract. Because they play rst, the contracts they design allow them to
anticipate with certainty what type(s) they are going to face for each contract oered. For further discussion
of this issue, see Mas-Colell (1995) Chapter 13.
7The menu of contracts will be empty at equilibrium if all possible loan contracts provide
the bank with strictly negative prots.
If the menu is composed of two contracts, and banks anticipate that each of them will
be selected by a dierent type of agent, the equilibrium is separating and q = ph for
the contract selected by high ability agents, while q = pl for the contract selected by
low ability agents.
Finally, the menu may be a singleton, and two scenarios emerge. Either banks anticipate
that both types will accept the contract, and q = pp  h + (1   )l (the equilibrium
involves pooling of both types). Or, alternatively, banks anticipate that only one type
will accept it. If this is the case, since the expected gain from investing in higher
education is higher for the high ability agent, she will be the one who takes such a
contract.
At equilibrium, then, student consumption levels in outcome  2 ff;sg are
c = maxfw   RF;(1   g)wg; (1)
for R  1 + r. Conversely, banks' prots under outcome  2 ff;sg write
 = minfRF;gwg   IF; (2)
where I  1 + i.
2.2 Graphical analysis
In order to analyze under which conditions the various types of equilibria will emerge, it
will prove convenient to represent all players' strategies in the space of consumption levels
of agents in case of failure and success (cf;cs), as illustrated in Figure 1. Such a space can
be divided into two subspaces relative to the two strategies that agents can play at stage 5:
repay or default. Let us dene in this space the set of allocations such that default does not
occur:
Denition 1 The default-proof space, DP(g) is the set of consumption bundles (cf;cs) such
that for all  2 ff;sg, w   RF  (1   g)w.
8In DP(g), c = w   RF  (1   g)w for all  2 ff;sg, while outside DP(g), there
exists at least one outcome  2 ff;sg such that c = (1   g)w > w   RF. This implies
that, in the space of consumption levels, one can establish a one to one relation between loan
contracts (rf;rs) and consumption levels (cf;cs) only inside DP(g). In other words, students
can credibly commit to pay interest rates (rf;rs) inside DP(g). Out of DP(g), a contract is
not respected, in which case banks are legally allowed to garnish gw and consumption is in
fact c = (1   g)w. Such consumption bundles are located on the boundaries of DP(g).
Two relevant types of contracts are to be considered on the boundaries of DP(g). First,
contracts such that cs = (1   g)ws. In this case, borrowers face the lowest possible con-
sumption in case of success. Since zero prots imply a balance between interest rates in
cases of failure and success, contracts on this (horizontal) boundary are those which provide
borrowers with the highest consumption in case of failure, i.e. the greatest level of insurance.
Second, contracts such that cf = (1   g)wf. We call this type the "non-insuring contracts":
Denition 2 A non-insuring contract is a contract such that, in case of failure, RfF > gwf
so that the borrower's consumption level is limited to the legal safety net: cf = (1   g)wf.
Note that a pure loan contract with R = Rf = Rs > I can be viewed as a non-insuring
contract where banks, anticipating that borrowers default in case of failure, adjust the interest
rate in order to avoid losses. However, as we have mentioned before, borrowers are still legally
insured even though banks do not oer any contractual insurance.
Let us now represent, in the space (cf;cs), the set of loan contracts that provide, for a
given expected probability of success q, zero expected prots. Since c +  = w   IF,
E(q;rf;rs) can be rewritten as
E(q;cf;cs) = q(ws   cs) + (1   q)(wf   cf)   IF: (3)
Equation (3) allows us to dene the zero prot locus in terms of combinations of consumption
bundles in case of failure and success (cf;cs).
Denition 3 Z(q;g) is the set of consumption bundles (cf;cs) in DP(g) such that, for a
probability of success q, banks make zero expected prots:
cs =









9Figure 1: Basic elements of the model
For convenience, we will often refer to Z(q)  Z(q;1), the zero-prot locus when
all contracts are immune to ex-post moral hazard. This will allow us to discuss and com-
pare these loci in the largest possible set of consumption bundles. Indeed, when g = 1,
c = maxfw   RF;0g, so that the default proof space is R2
+. In Figure 1, as g decreases
(penalties become softer) the default-proof space shrinks, its origin moving along G - the set
of consumption bundles (cf;cs) such that cs = (ws=wf)cf - towards (wf;ws). Figure 1 also
depicts, in the (cf;cs) space, the default-proof space and the zero prot loci: Z(pl), when
contracts are accepted only by low ability agents; Z(pp), for contracts that pool together
high and low ability agents; and Z(ph), for contracts that separate high ability agents.
Clearly, the slope of a zero prot locus is given by  (1   q)=q. Thus, since pl < pp < ph,
Z(ph) is the attest of these loci, followed by Z(pp) and, nally, Z(pl), the steepest one.
Also, zero prot loci cross at (cf;cs) = (wf  IF;ws  IF). Finally, note that bundles below
[above] Z() yield positive [negative] prots. Still in this gure, FI is the certainty or full
insurance line, characterized by the set of consumption bundles (cf;cs) such that cf = cs.
Finally, point O in Figure 1 represents the outside option of refusing all contracts and
remaining unskilled (wf;wf). For simplicity of presentation, we assume that it is inecient
10for low ability individuals to invest in education:7
Assumption 1 pl(ws   wf) < IF.
As a result, point O is above Z(pl). Also, Il [Ih] is the set of consumption bundles C
such that EUl(C) = U(wf) [EUh(C) = U(wf)], i.e., the low [high] ability agent's indierence
curve for the utility level obtained at the outside option.
3 Characterization of the equilibria
In this section, we solve the game for all values of g. The rst subsection deals with "soft"
default penalties (low g). We show that the interaction between ex-post moral hazard and
adverse selection yields complete credit rationing, i.e., no loans are oered at equilibrium.
The second subsection studies intermediate default penalties (intermediate g). In such a case,
the market equilibrium is characterized by pooling contracts where no insurance takes place.
The third subsection presents the conditions under which no equilibrium exists. The last
subsection discusses the case where default penalties are largest, which results in a separating
equilibrium where only the more able invest in education. It also provides a nal proposition
that collects all the results and highlights the role of student risk aversion in determining
the market outcome. In particular, if risk aversion is too high, the interval of intermediate
default penalties becomes empty, which implies in this case that pooling never occurs at
equilibrium.
3.1 Low default penalties
When default penalties are suciently low, the best strategy at the last stage is for agents to
default. Yet, since penalties are low, banks' revenues yield negative prots, so they will not
oer any contract. As default penalties g increase, a market will eventually emerge because
garnishments in case of default start generating sucient revenues to allow the funding of
some projects at low interest rates. We discuss here the upper bound on default penalties
such that credit rationing exists. The main intuition in this subsection is that credit rationing
will prevail as long two conditions are met. First, the garsnishment rate has to be low enough
so that banks will not be able to provide high ability agents with separating contracts which
7The more general case is treated in Del Rey and Verheyden (2008), of which an updated version is
available upon request.
11these agents can credibly commit to repay. Second, the garsnishment rate needs also be low
enough for banks to be able to provide both types with default-proof pooling contracts that
yield non negative prots.
We thus start from g = 0 and gradually increase it. Graphically, increasing g will make
the default proof space move downwards, its origin shifting along G towards (0,0). Trivially, if
g = 0, the borrower has the choice between repaying her loan or default and suer no penalty
at all. In turn, the bank does not receive any payments and makes losses. As g increases,
some contracts become exempt of default, but they involve very small interest rates since
penalties are still very low and agents prefer otherwise to default. Those interest rates are
so small that, even if loans were taken by high ability agents alone, they would not allow
to cover the risk-free interest rate i, and thus would still yield negative prots. Hence, the
market does not exist.
Denition 4 Let gh
0 be the lowest g such that Z(ph;g) is non-empty.
When g reaches gh
0, banks can oer contracts that are exempt of default and that would,
if only high ability agents took them, yield non-negative prots. However, a contract corre-
sponding to the singleton Z(ph;gh
0), i.e. Z(ph)\G would also be preferred by low ability
agents to the outside option.8 Therefore, expected prots would still be negative, and banks
would still refuse to oer loan contracts.
Denition 5 Let g2 be the minimum g such that Il \ Z(ph;g) is non-empty.
Figure 2 depicts B  Il \ Z(ph) and the corresponding default-proof space DP(g2).
When g reaches g2, banks are able to oer a contract on Z(ph;g2) that only high ability
agents will pick, since, as stated in Denition 5, this contract, which corresponds to point
B, provides low ability agents with the same utility level as the outside option. Banks are
therefore no longer making losses and a market for student loans emerges.
The threshold g2 may however be very large.9 Then, banks might want to look for other
options rather than trying to specically target high ability agents. For instance, even though
8This is always true given the following assumption, which, although not necessary proves useful for the
presentation of results. Let (cf;cs) be the point where Il intersects Z(ph). We assume cs  (ws=wf)cf, i.e.
Il \ Z(ph) lies to the left of G. The implications of relaxing this assumption are available upon request.
9This is more likely, on the one hand, the lower the level of risk aversion and on the other, the higher
the probability of success of high ability agents. To see why, keep in mind that the slope of Z(p) equals
 (1   p)=p, which is increasing in p.
12Figure 2: Credit rationing equilibrium
g were lower than g2, it might be suciently high so that contracts that yield zero prots
when both types accept them become default-proof: Z(pp;g) is non-empty. The level of g
that is just sucient to allow banks to oer a default-proof contract that yields non-negative
prots when both types pick it (P0 in Figure 2) is noted g
p
0:
Denition 6 Let g
p
0 be the minimum g such that Z(pp;g) is non-empty. It is such that
Z(pp;g
p
0) = P0  Z(pp) \ G
Summing up, credit rationing exists as long as banks are unable to oer loans that bor-
rowers can credibly commit to repay. More precisely, credit rationing exists as long as default
penalties are not sucient to allow banks either to screen borrowers (g < g2) or to pool them
(g < g
p
0). This result is stated formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Credit rationing exists at equilibrium if and only if 0  g < minfg
p
0;g2g.





failure can be solved rather trivially if we can provide the information that allows to identify
high ability individuals provided that g is large enough to rule out default by these individ-
uals. This shows that banks refrain from oering loan contracts when default penalties are
13low because of the interaction between ex-post moral hazard and adverse selection. In the
following subsection we explore the consequences of increasing g on the equilibrium.
3.2 Intermediate default penalties
As default penalties increase further, more contracts become default-proof (DP(g) continues
to move down). In this subsection, we explore the possibility that a pooling equilibrium
exists and show that, when it does, banks do not oer any market insurance beyond the legal
safety net (1   g)w. Therefore, the main conditions for pooling to exist are that default
penalties should be high enough to avoid credit rationing, but at the same time not too high,
otherwise the legal safety net would be too low for low ability agents -who are most likely to
fail- to accept the pooling contract. One gets the intuition from this reasoning that pooling
may not always exist. We show that low student risk aversion is crucial to determine the
non-emptiness of the interval of default penalties that is compatible with pooling.
A rst condition that must be met is that g  g
p
0. This ensures that there exists at
least one potential pooling contract (P0 in Figure 2). For the moment, assume all necessary
conditions are satised and a pooling equilibrium exists. Lemma 1 shows that this equilibrium
is always unique and non-insuring, i.e., the equilibrium contract does not contain any market
insurance and leaves unsuccessful students with the lowest consumption level legally tolerated,
(1   g)wf.
Lemma 1 If a pooling equilibrium exists, it is unique and it is such that the contract oered
by banks is non-insuring.
The formal proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix 1. Figure 3 depicts a pooling
equilibrium candidate with insurance, where both types of students accept a contract that






. The dark shaded area represents a
set of consumption bundles that have two important characteristics. On the one hand, these
bundles are preferred by high ability agents to PI, while they provide low ability agents with
lower utility. On the other hand, this set of bundles lies below Z(ph;g). A bank oering a
contract corresponding to any of these bundles will thus attract only high types and make
positive prots. Since a protable deviation exists, this candidate is not an equilibrium. In
fact, the only contract on Z(ph;g) for which there is no protable deviation is the non-







14Figure 3: No insurance at the pooling equilibrium
Lemma 1 provides an explanation for the lack of insurance in student loans oered by private
banks, which is one of the market failures that we wanted to analyze. Also keep in mind that
even though banks do not provide any private insurance and may apply the same interest
rate in every state of the world, borrowers are insured by the legal system against the risk
of failure as long as g < 1. As default penalties increase, the non-insuring contract becomes
less attractive because legal insurance is reduced. Then, a pooling equilibrium is less likely.
Let us thus now study the exact conditions under which pooling non-insuring contracts are
not oered at equilibrium.
First, as we have just mentioned, as the law on default gets tougher, the "safety net"
consumption level in case of failure (1   g)wf eventually becomes so low that the pooling
contract is no longer preferred by low ability agents to the outside option. The threshold
g1 formally denes the level of g at which a low ability agent is indierent between the
outside option and the non-insuring, pooling contract. Let A  (cf;cs) be the point where
Il intersects Z(pp) (see Figure 4).10
10Note that (cf;cs) may not exist because the outside option may provide higher consumption levels in
both states of the world than the potential full insurance pooling contract. Since the slope of Il is strictly
larger than that of Z(pp), these two loci can never cross in this case.
15Figure 4: Existence of the pooling equilibrium
Denition 7 The threshold g1 is such that
 if (cf;cs) exists and cs  (ws=wf)cf, g1 = ming such that (cf;cs) 2 DP(g),
 if (cf;cs) exists and cs < (ws=wf)cf, g1 = g
p
0
 if (cf;cs) does not exist, g1 = g
p
0.
From the discussion above, g < g1 is necessary for a pooling equilibrium. Note that
g1  g
p
0 in any case, which will prove useful in the discussion of Proposition 2.
A second reason why pooling may not exist is that banks might nd it protable to deviate
from the pooling non-insuring contract to oer another pooling contract that provides more
insurance and yields positive prots. Graphically, this can only be the case if the high ability
agents' indierence curve that goes through the pooling non-insuring contract is steeper than
Z(pp). Let now (e cf;e cs)  A0 be the point on Z(pp) that is most preferred by a high ability
type (see Figure 4).
Denition 8 The threshold g0
1 is such that
16 if e cs > (ws=wf)e cf, g0
1 = min g such that (e cs;e cf) 2 DP(g)




Again, we need g < g0





Given the constraints on g for the existence of a pooling equilibrium and the fact that
apart from strict concavity, we do not impose any assumption on preferences, it may be the
case that a pooling equilibrium does not exist for any g. However, we have isolated one
condition on the ordering of thresholds, Condition 1, that is both necessary and sucient for
the non-emptiness of the interval of g that is compatible with a pooling equilibrium.
Condition 1







Note that Condition 1 limits the degree of risk aversion of agents of low and high ability.
Later, we will refer to low risk aversion to describe a situation where Condition 1 holds.




The proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward given the denitions of the thresholds. Proposi-
tion 2 provides a formal statement of the interval of g which supports a pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If Condition 1 is met, a pooling equilibrium exists if and only if g
p
0  g <
minfg1;g0
1g. Otherwise, a pooling equilibrium does not exist for any g 2 [0;1].
The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix 2. Figure 4 depicts a pooling equilibrium where
the upper bound on g for a pooling equilibrium to exist, minfg1;g0
1g, equals g1. It is important





0 when a pooling equilibrium exists. Indeed, by Proposition 2, Condition 1
must apply for a pooling equilibrium to exist, and Condition 1 implies that g2 > g
p
0. In Figure
4, the pooling equilibrium thus emerges for values of g comprised between g
p
0 and g1. For
the level of default penalty g represented in Figure 4, the pooling contract is represented by
P . This leaves unsuccessful agents with the lowest possible level of consumption, (1 g)wf.
Finally, note that the pooling equilibrium is inecient by assumption.11
11Clearly, when the assumption that the investment in education by low ability individuals is inecient is
relaxed, the pooling equilibrium is no longer characterized by overinvestment (see Del Rey and Verheyden
(2008) for a treatment of this case).
17Summing up, we have seen in this subsection that the market can exist when the default
penalty g is not too low, and provided two conditions limiting the degree of risk aversion of
agents are met. Banks will then oer a single pooling contract that involves no insurance.
Of course, the legal system does provide some insurance, by limiting the amount banks can
garnish in the eventuality of default. This amount that banks can garnish is not enough
for banks to cover the costs of lending to those who fail, i.e., gwf < IF: This is due to the
fact that point A in Figure 4 lies necessarily to the right of wf   IF (since Il is tangent to
E(pl) on the Full Insurance line and agents are risk averse). Then, wf   IF < (1   g1)wf
or IF > g1wf > gwf when g < g1. If g0
1 < g1, then A0 lies to the right of A and a similar
argument applies. In spite of the fact that banks make losses on those who fail, they are able
to break even when pooling both individual types together.
3.3 Larger default penalties
In this model, there are three types of equilibrium: credit rationing, pooling and separating.
So far, we have identied the necessary conditions for a credit rationing equilibrium and a
pooling, non-insuring equilibrium to exist. Thus, if the conditions we have provided are not
met, such types of equilibria do not exist. In this subsection, we identify the conditions under
which neither does a separating equilibrium exist. Then, there will be no equilibrium in pure
strategies.
A separating contract may exist if, as stated in Subsection 3.1, g  g2. In this case, banks
oer a unique contract which only high ability individuals accept. This contract entails so
little legal insurance that it deters low ability agents from taking it, so that these agents
remain unskilled. Conversely, if g < g2, default penalties are lower, or equivalently, the
degree of legal insurance is higher. This prevents banks from oering a contract that only
high ability agents would pick.
In the previous subsection, we dened necessary and sucient conditions under which
a pooling equilibrium may exist. In this subsection, we also describe the necessary and
sucient condition under which, for some levels of g, no equilibrium exists.
Condition 2 : g2 > g
p
0.
Note that Condition 1 implies Condition 2, but not the other way around. Thus, Con-
dition 2 also limits the degree of risk aversion of a low ability individual, but less so than
Condition 1. For this reason, we will later refer to moderate risk aversion to describe a
18situation where Condition 1 does not hold but Condition 2 does. If Condition 2 does not
hold either we will refer to large risk aversion.
Lemma 3 Condition 2 is necessary and sucient for minfg1;g0
1g < g2.
To prove Lemma 3, let us rst show that Condition 2 implies minfg1;g0
1g < g2. On the
one hand, Condition 2 implies g2 > g1, and g1  minfg1;g0
1g. Therefore, g2 is greater than
each element in minfg1;g0
1g. Let us now prove the other implication, that minfg1;g0
1g < g2
implies Condition 2. Assume not, then minfg1;g0
1g > g2. If minfg1;g0
1g = g1 > g2 which is
impossible by the curvature of Il. If minfg1;g0
1g = g0
1 > g2, since g2 > g1, then g0
1 > g1 and
hence it is not the smaller of the two, leading to a contradiction.
Proposition 3 If Condition 2 applies, the game has no equilibrium in pure strategies when
minfg1;g0
1g  g < g2.
The absence of equilibrium in pure strategies is illustrated in Figure 4, where minfg1;g0
1g =
g1. No equilibrium thus exists for g1 < g < g2 in this case.
To prove Proposition 3, let us simply gather the information already available, keeping
in mind that there are only three types of equilibrium candidates, namely credit rationing,
pooling and separation. First, we know that if g  minfg1;g0
1g, neither pooling nor credit
rationing can be equilibria. Second, we have shown that if g < g2, a separating equilibrium
cannot exist, Q.E.D..
Let us nish the characterization of the equilibria by the case where default penalties are
largest, which can result in the separating equilibrium.
3.4 Largest default penalties
Once default penalties attain the largest levels, i.e., g > g2, banks can oer contracts that
leave low ability individuals indierent between them and the outside option, while high
ability agents strictly prefer them to the pooling option. A separating equilibrium arises and
it is ecient, since only high ability individuals invest in education. This case is illustrated
in Figure 5.
Proposition 4 A unique separating equilibrium exists for g2  g  1. Banks oer a unique
contract which attracts only high ability agents and entails some market insurance as long as
g > g2.
19Figure 5: Separating equilibrium
This separating contract is represented by point B. Note that, in spite of the fact that
banks may oer some insurance, because legal protection of the borrower is now lower, the
individual ends up less insured than at the pooling equilibrium when this exists. That is,
provided that individuals show low risk aversion levels (i.e., under Condition 1).
The level of insurance granted to the high ability type is limited in this case by the self-
selection constraint of the low ability individual. In a sense, we can then argue that the credit
market for students does not fail when default penalties are suciently large: high ability
individuals are able to borrow and insure their loans to a certain extent. When students hold
private information about their ability, it is impossible to provide high ability students with
more insurance without dragging low ability individuals into investing in education, which is
inecient by assumption.12
Summing up our ndings, we have characterized the outcome corresponding to each
possible level of default penalty. Indeed, the intervals stated in Propositions 1 to 4 provide
a proper partition of the domain of g, i.e. [0;1]. By gathering Propositions 1 to 4, one can
12When the investment in education by both types is ecient, the market failures are limited for suciently
large default penalties. However, in that case, banks use dierent insurance levels to separate students.
Participation is, again, ecient, and low ability students, with a higher probability of failure, enjoy larger
levels of insurance. (See Del Rey and Verheyden (2008).)
20conclude that each type of equilibrium, as well as the case in which there is no equilibrium,
may emerge for mutually exclusive intervals of g. In other words, when an equilibrium






0. Also if Condition 2 does not apply, g2 < g
p
0. Since this also implies that Condition
1 is not satised, g1 = g
p
0(> g2). Then, we can write Proposition 5 to summarize our results:
Proposition 5 Gathering Propositions 1 to 4, the game entails three possible scenarios:
1. Low Risk Aversion: Condition 1 (hence Condition 2) apply. The relevant intervals and
their corresponding equilibria are then:
 [0;g
p




1g[, unique pooling non-insuring equilibrium
 [minfg1;g0
1g;g2[, no equilibrium in pure strategies
 [g2;1], unique separating equilibrium
2. Moderate Risk Aversion: Condition 1 does not apply, but Condition 2 does. The rele-
vant intervals and their corresponding equilibria are then:
 [0;g
p
0[, unique credit rationing equilibrium
 [g
p
0;g2[, no equilibrium in pure strategies
 [g2;1], unique separating equilibrium
3. Large Risk Aversion: Condition 2 (hence Condition 1) do not apply. The relevant
intervals and their corresponding equilibria are then:
 [0;g2[, unique credit rationing equilibrium
 [g2;1], unique separating equilibrium.
Credit rationing results under each possible scenario for low values of g. For the existence
of a market that however fails to provide insurance, we need to impose the necessary and
sucient Condition 1, which, as previously mentioned, limits the degree of risk aversion of
both types of agents. Conversely, a unique separating equilibrium results under each possible
scenario for suciently large values of the default penalty, g. When individuals show large
degrees of risk aversion (Condition 2 is not satised), this is the only feasible market solution.
21To conclude the analysis, let us consider the possibility that a contract involving the risk-
less interest rate i in both states of the world is default-proof. This implies that g  IF=wf,
i.e. banks manage to recover the investment in case of failure of either type. There is no
reason, then, for the market to fail. Indeed, arguing as before, point B must necessarily lie to
the right of wf   IF. Then, g2 < IF=wf 6 g. From Proposition 5, a separating equilibrium
arises when g  g2.
The next section is devoted to providing some additional applications of the model.
4 Comparative statics
The model can be also used to explain some additional and distinct stylized facts. First,
according to Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2008), the rising returns to higher education
in the United States provide an explanation for the dramatic increase in private lending.
Interestingly, our model can be used to show that private loans are more likely to be oered
the higher the return to education in case of success. Second, it is observed that most private
student loans are actually subsidized by governments (Shen and Ziderman (2007)). Our
model allows us to show that the introduction of such subsidies does indeed improve the case
for private lending. Third, the model also allows us to discuss the case for public income
contingent loans. We show that governments can oer pooling loans comprising substantial
insurance either if they enforce the exclusive use of public nance schemes or if they face
competition and lend at lower interest rates than the market (in which case the program
would show a budget decit).
We start by analyzing the impact of exogenous changes in the wage in case of success.
Then we study the role of an exogenous cash inow used to subsidize the interest rate i.
Finally, we refer to the case for public income contingent student loans.
4.1 Role of the wage in case of success
Changes in ws aect the location of the zero prot loci (4). They also change the slope of G
(ws=wf) and thus the location of the default proof space DP(g).
If ws increases, income after default in case of success (1   g)ws increases and DP(g)
becomes smaller (G becomes steeper while (1   g)wf does not change). For a unit increase
in ws, DP(g) moves upwards by (1   g). Yet, the zero prot loci move up by 1 unit, so
22that (additional) zero-prot contracts become available inside DP(g). The reason is that
the bank is able to oer better conditions in case of success compared to the default option,
(1   g)ws. Indeed, a borrower who repays her loan benets from the whole wage increase,
whereas a defaulter would only increase her consumption by a fraction (1 g) of that increase.
Individuals will be less prone to default and this makes it more likely for the market to exist.
Thus, higher wages in case of success improve the case for private student loans, ceteris
paribus.
4.2 Role of a subsidy on the interest rate
Suppose that the government benets from an exogenous inow of cash that it uses to
subsidize banks' costs of borrowing i. Because of Bertrand competition, this lower cost will
immediately be transferred to the borrower: interest rates will be lower and allow higher
consumption bundles in case of failure and success. Lower interest rates, on the other hand,
make it less protable to default. Thus the existence of the market is compatible with lower
levels of the penalty g when banks are subsidized. In other words, subsidies of this kind can
take the economy from a credit rationing equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium (when risk
aversion is low, or Condition 1 holds) or to a separating equilibrium (when risk aversion is
large, or Condition 2 does not apply).
Graphically, the reduction in i translates into an upward shift of the zero prot loci,
while their slope remains unaltered (see Equation (4)). Given g, the fall in i thus incites
banks to oer contracts, as some of those contracts now generate non-negative prots despite
asymmetric information and ex-post moral hazard. If risk aversion is large, the separating
equilibrium, which involves the provision of some insurance by banks, is easier to obtain.
Whether the benets exceed the costs attached to obtaining the resources required to provide
this subsidies remains a subject for future research.
4.3 Public income contingent loans
Unlike private banks, it is observed that governments oer pooling contracts with insurance,
such as point PI on Figure 3. According to the model, there are two reasons why this can be
done. On the one hand, governments, unlike banks, can act alone on this market. By forcing
students to participate in the public program (forbidding private lenders to oer student
loans), governments can prevent deviations that would attract high ability agents out of the
23pooling insuring contract, and thus maintain the sustainability of the system. On the other
hand, if private banks are allowed to oer student loans, the government can use budget
revenues in order to lend at lower interest rates. According to the analysis undertaken in the
previous subsection, this will shift the pooling zero-prot locus of the government upwards,
improving the case for public (and not private) loans. As we have mentioned before, pooling
contracts with insurance may lead to over-participation, i.e., some individuals will invest
in education in spite of the fact that their expected earnings are below the cost of this
investment.13
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a model to analyze the student loan market and explain its
potential failures, along with other important stylized facts. We have considered risk averse
agents who need to borrow in order to invest in education and who are heterogeneous in the
probability of success. A particularity of our model is that it combines adverse selection with
the possibility for agents to repay their loan only if this is less costly than incurring default.
This allows us to retrieve the role of information asymmetries in explaining failures in the
credit and insurance markets for students. Default penalties are determined by law and are
dened here as the share of the wage that banks are allowed to garnish. Banks are perfectly
competitive and are unable to observe the ability of students. They oer a menu of loan
contracts that may include insurance against the eventuality of failure. In this framework,
we have characterized the outcome corresponding to each possible level of default penalty
and we have shown that when an equilibrium exists, it is unique.
When default penalties are suciently low, banks do not oer student loans. This rst
market failure results in our model from the combination of ex post moral hazard and adverse
selection. The eect of raising default penalties on the market outcome depends on the degree
of risk aversion of students. If risk aversion is low, intermediate default penalties generate
a pooling equilibrium characterised by the strict absence of market insurance, yielding a
second type of market failure. If risk aversion is high, pooling does not occur at equilibrium.
Instead, banks are able to oer loan contracts characterized by limited levels of market
13Even if participation of lower ability students was ecient, the superiority of pooling contracts with
insurance over separating contracts would only be guaranteed for suciently subsidized interest rates. The
opportunity costs of the resulting decit and, in particular, its relative ecacity if devoted to bank subsidies
instead, should also be considered if we were to nd the best policy. We leave these issues for further research.
24insurance which only attract students of high ability, allowing ecient participation.
To assess the actual severity of default penalties in reality is a dicult exercise. Eective
default penalties depend not only on the law, but also the cost of law enforcement and the
regulation of personal bankruptcy. There are also cultural and psychological factors that
aect the perceived size of the penalty. The fact that, when we observe the existence of a
market of student loans, these are of the pooling-non-insuring type, may be interpreted as
evidence that default penalties are of intermediate size. However, public interventions on the
student loan market are in general substantial. Thus, what we generally observe is not a
pure market outcome and, as we have seen, the level of default penalties that accompany a
subsidized market are likely to be lower than those of an unsubsidized market.
Our model provides a framework for the analysis of student loan policy. As a way of
example, we have used it to show how an exogenous increase in the wage in case of success
can improve the case for private student loans for any given level of default penalties. Also, we
have shown how subsidies can bring about private loans and how governments can implement
income contingent schemes.
The model is certainly simple and leaves out of the scope of the analysis important aspects
of credit markets such as market power, legal costs associated to collecting penalties, other
costs associated to default or the role of collateral, among others. Yet, the model provides a
useful benchmark and can be extended to account for some of these issues, that we leave for
future research.
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Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1
For a pooling equilibrium to exist, Z(pp;g) must be non-empty. Lemma 1 claims that,
among all contracts that are pooling equilibrium candidates, or equivalently, among all cor-
responding consumption bundles (cf;cs) 2 Z(pp;g), only the non-insured bundle PNI(g) =
((1   g)wf;(ppws   IF + (1   pp)gwf)=pp) emerges at the pooling equilibrium. To see why,




f > (1   g)wf and ci
s < (ppws   IF + (1   pp)gwf)=pp, and show that there ex-
ists a protable deviation from (ci
f;ci
s), so that the latter cannot be an equilibrium. By
single crossing of the two types' indierence curves, there always exists some other bundle
(cd
f;cd









s) > 0. In other words, if banks oer a pooling contract that implies
a consumption bundle (ci
f;ci
s), there always exists a protable deviation, which consists in
oering a contract they know that only high types would accept, and that would yield strictly
positive expected prots. The dark shade area in Figure 3 represents such protable devia-
tions from (ci
f;ci
s). Finally, note that PNI(g) is the only bundle in Z(pp;g) such that such
a protable deviation does not exist.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2
The proof has 3 steps. First, let us start by showing that when Condition 1 is not met,




1g[ is empty. We have shown before Proposition 2 that pooling could
only exist within this interval. Therefore, a pooling equilibrium cannot exist for any g 2 [0;1].




1g[ is non-empty, the existence of the pooling equilibrium implies that
27g
p
0  g < minfg1;g0
1g. We have actually proved this in the discussion prior to the propo-
sition. Indeed, we have shown that for values of g that are outside this interval, a pooling
equilibrium cannot exist. Hence, if a pooling equilibrium exists, it has to be the case that
g
p
0  g < minfg1;g0
1g.




1g[ is non-empty), g
p
0  g < minfg1;g0
1g implies the existence of a pooling
equilibrium. Let us thus show that under these conditions, there exist no protable deviations
from the pooling non-insuring equilibrium candidate. In order to do that, it will prove useful
to refer to I
h as the indierence curve of high ability agents at the equilibrium candidate.
First, low (and a fortiori high) ability agents do not want to deviate from the non-insuring
contract to the outside option because g < g1. Consider now all contracts on I
h or below.
Since g < g0
1, I
h is above Z(pp;g), so that any other contract strictly between I
h and
Z(pl;g) will make losses, as it will be accepted by low ability types alone. Finally, contracts
above I
h are preferred by both types, but since g < g0
1, those contracts are above Z(pp;g)
and thus, make losses. As a result, there is no protable deviation from the pooling non-
insuring equilibrium candidate. This concludes the proof of Proposition 2.
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